1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
|
<?php
$title = "On The Hard Problem";
require($_SERVER["DOCUMENT_ROOT"] . "/head.php");
require($_SERVER["DOCUMENT_ROOT"] . "/header.php");
?>
<p>
The phrase "Hard Problem of Consciousness" was coined in 1994, and is the subject of no small controversy.
It is something that
I have attempted to create a satisfactory explanation for over most of my life, to constant frustration. I am writing
this article now, not because I have solved the problem, but because I have failed to solve the problem enough times
that I am confident I can clearly describe its exact nature. It is in this description of the very nature of the
problem that many authors begin to introduce confusion; through a careful propositional structuring of my argument, I
intend to avoid this error, and to then convince the reader that my specific interpretation of the hard problem is both
the only reasonable belief, and intrinsically, fatally flawed. In doing so, I hope to enable the reader to share in my
frustration as it concerns this unsolveable problem.
</p>
<h2>The Brain</h2>
<p>
Defining consciousness is itself no easy task. The term has been used by various authors in various ways, and each of
these definitions introduces additional ambiguity. To define exactly what I mean in referring to consciousness, we must
first reach an understanding of the <i>scope</i> of the term. Consciousness, as I will use the term, appears to be closely
related to the human brain--and so I say that its scope, as far as we are concerned, is limited to complex systems. A complex
system may be described as any sufficiently large set of physical objects that interact frequently,
and that have been <i>designed</i>, either by intention or by circumstance, to perform some task. In the case of the human brain,
that task is of course reproduction and survival. To accomplish that task, the brain must receive sensory information,
process it, and, based on the result of that processing, control the body. This process can be modelled at the highest level in
psychology, at a lower level in biology, and at the lowest level by physics. At the lowest level, the brain is acting in a
(excluding quantum nondeterminism) deterministic manner, defined by the basic interaction of carefully arranged molecules.
It is the opinion of some authors that this description of the brain minimizes human agency. I reject this--human agency
is itself a product of the process I have described, and cannot be minimized by a description of its origin. The reason for
this concern can likely be ascribed to the long-standing belief in some form of <i>soul</i>, or other intangible, immeasurable
entity separate from the mechanical processes of the brain. <b>The brain evidently determines behaviour.</b>
</p>
<h2>The Soul</h2>
<p>
The soul, spirit, or anima is typically taken to be the entity which contains or defines a person's individual nature.
The soul is necessarily quantized, perhaps being able to be created or destroyed but never subdivided, and non-fungible,
each being unique in some form. While brain cells may die and the body may change, the soul is a persistent, non-mutable
identity. The exact purpose, origin, and location of the soul varies by interpretation. Whether it is responsible for will,
or godliness; created at conception, or repurposed, from some prior incarnation in rebirth; or whether it is located in the
heart, or in the pineal gland--the soul is a concept that has been invented by multiple independant cultures over
human history, and is deeply important to the philosophy and religion of a significant portion of those alive today.
The specific reason for the prevalence of a belief in the soul is easily ascribed to humans' perception of ourselves
as conscious, and a desire to understand the origin and nature of that consciousness.
<b>The soul evidently determines behaviour.</b>
</p>
<h2>The Problem</h2>
<p>
If the brain adequately explains human psychology, if thoughts are merely specific patterns of neurons firing,
it seems that there is no place for the soul in modern science.
</p>
<h2>(There isn't) An Analogy</h2>
<p>
Consider reading my essay concerning <a href="analogy.php">analogies</a> prior to continuing this article.
Philosophers, and those experiencing existential crises, have frequently referenced a set of thought experiments concerning
a common theme: that the consensus material world may not be <i>real</i>, or, more precisely, that it may not be the base stratum
of objectivity. Possibly the first record of this concern was René Descartes's <i>evil demon</i> argument, which posits that
one's senses may be an illusion created by some malevolent agent--an all powerful demon capable of inducing to you any sensory
perception he chooses. A more modern phrasing is the <i>brain in a jar</i> scenario. In this case, some future technology
enables the brain to be suspended and kept living inside of an artificial environment. This brain is precisely stimulated
by computer, generating a simulated perception of a reality, which could be entirely different from the one the brain is
located in. Other, analogous arguments include the <i>Boltzmann Brain</i>, the simulation hypothesis, and certain interpretations
of hell, heaven, and purgatory.
</p>
<p>
Consider these arguments. They are irrefutable--we must live as though they are false, but we cannot prove that they are. We can,
however, take one important point from them: regardless of what specific reality we may interpret, and what specific reality may
truly exist, it is evident that we have an acute sense of our own existence as some form of entity; it is unclear whether we are being
tricked, but it is clear that there is something to <i>be</i> tricked.
</p>
<h2>Thought Experiment</h2>
<p>
Suppose we had access to some form of device capable of precisely measuring the exact state of every neuron and neurotransmitter
in some test subject's brain. Suppose that we could record this data over a few minutes, and run the tape in reverse, observing the
cause of every effect. We would introduce some stimulus to the subject--say, a red cube--who would have been instructed to describe
what he sees. We would observe his statement, "I see a red cube," and end the recording.
We begin analyzing the data. First, we note which neurons were responsible for signalling the muscular activity required to create
speech. We name this set N0. We record the set of all neurons whose axon terminals had interaction with any neuron in N0, and name
these after the neuron with which they interacted. We iteratively perform this regress until we have a tree structure which contains
every neuron involved in the signal processing from observation to statement.
</p>
<p>
The question is as follows: would, at any point in the recording, a neuron demonstrate behaviour not in line with the action
potential model? Specifically, would a neuron ever fire without a measurable physical cause? In the case where this does occur,
we have observed what appears to be something very strange--a physical effect without a physical cause. In the case where this
does not occur, we have observed something perhaps stranger.
</p>
<?php require($_SERVER["DOCUMENT_ROOT"] . "/footer.php"); ?>
|
